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 1. Introduction 
 
In order for a country to grow, it has to ensure that all its citizens acquire the skills and 
quality of education needed to be able to compete in a modern, integrated and 
globalized world. Based on economic theory, having a competent education system will 
lead to the rise of long-run economic growth rates, since human capital investment 
increases labour productivity and is considered a vital input for innovation and technical 
progress (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; Barro 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In the 
context of the African Economies, nowadays higher education is essential for economic 
development (Kimenyi, 2011). Likewise, school quality and not just quantity, is crucial 
in shaping a country’s economic growth (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Hanushek and 
Woessman, 2008). Thus, improvement in the efficiency of education is a key variable 
for a country’s development. 
 
It is commonly known that having a highly functioning education system is only 
possible in presence of a supportive institutional structure; decentralisation is a 
fundamental aspect of current institutional innovation throughout the world, where local 
autonomy has been an issue of intense debate in both developed and developing 
countries. Several international agencies like the World Bank, the OECD and the United 
Nations have been recommending decentralisation, especially in education, as an 
approach for development and growth, since the 1960s. Within this framework, 
Nechyba (2003) argues that school autonomy is expected to result in greater public 
school efficiency. 
 
Plentiful empirical literature has put efforts in order to estimate the impact of 
government spending decentralisation on educational outcomes, where most evidence 
gives support to decentralised education systems as it heightens student achievement 
(Falch and Fischer 2012). However, research has not given emphasis on solely 
decentralisation; choice as well as accountability measures are also vastly significant 
institutional features affecting the quality of education (Nechyba 2000; Bishop and 
Woessmann 2004). Accountability systems deliver better information on student 
performance, and thus directly or indirectly reward students, teachers and principals for 
their actions. Moreover, school choice due to competition brings about a boost in school 
performance (Sandstrom and Bergstrom 2005; Woessmann and others 2009).  
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Our study examines the effects of decentralisation and school autonomy (this considers 
school management, ownership and funding, competition and accountability measures) 
on the quality of education in Jordan and Tunisia, after controlling for school factors, 
student and family characteristics. The data utilized in our analysis is the OECD’s 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 database since it 
encompasses an adequate proxy for the quality of education, which is the students’ test 
scores in mathematics and reading. The main contribution of this paper is being the first 
to examine decentralisation effects on the quality of education in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, as well as being an addition to the scarce research on 
school autonomy in developing countries. Furthermore, we examine our variables of 
interest using the most updated data (PISA 2009) in comparison to other similar studies. 
The choice of Jordan and Tunisia as the focus of our study is entitled to the fact that 
they rank 1st and 2nd respectively in the MENA region according to the Human 
Development Index in 2007. Hence, both countries could be used as a benchmark for 
the rest of the region to follow.  
 
Our findings show that decentralisation (defined as regional or local education 
authorities having total or partial responsibility for educational policies) has a moderate 
impact on the quality of education in some decision-making areas. Complete or partial 
decentralisation in school budget formulation and establishing student assessment 
policies is positively associated with student achievement in Tunisia, while complete or 
partial decentralisation in personnel decisions has a positive effect on student 
achievement in Jordan. Regarding school autonomy variables, we find that autonomy 
management has no significant effect on student attainment in both countries, except for 
a minor negative impact in Jordan. Results reveal that publically operated schools 
perform significantly better in Tunisia; however the type of school operation has no 
effect on achievement in Jordan. Private funding in all types of schools leads to a rise in 
students’ test scores in both countries, while competition has no significant impact on 
student achievement, with the exception of a slight positive effect on mathematics in 
Jordan. Concerning the accountability variables examined, our outcomes show that 
comparing students’ assessments to district/national performance or other schools, as 
well as parental pressure on schools both play an important positive role in Tunisia and 
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 Jordan. While, schools that post achievement data publicly do not lead to distinctive 
student test scores, except for a slight negative impact on reading literacy in Jordan.  
 
We would like to highlight the following. First, this paper analyses a group of variables 
not considered in the analysis of educational systems in MENA countries (especially 
those referring to decentralization). Second, it employs the most updated data available 
enclosing information about educational autonomy and decentralization for the 
countries considered. Finally, the methodology used allows us to provide robust results.  
We expect the results to help policy makers and government officials build more 
efficient education systems regarding students’ achievement. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the previous 
literature regarding the institutional features, which are our variables of interest. Section 
II provides a description of the data used in our study as well as the empirical strategy 
utilized. Then, results are shown in section III and a final section summarizes our 
conclusions.  
 
2. Decentralization, autonomy and students’ achievement 
 
This section includes the institutional features that have received the utmost interest in 
the previous literature around the world: Decentralisation (2.1), in addition to several 
issues related to school autonomy such as autonomy management (2.2), ownership and 
funding (2.3), competition (2.3) and accountability measures (2.4).  
 
2.1. Decentralisation 
 
Bottani (2000) states that several countries have applied educational reforms since 
1980, which principally decentralised authority from central to local level. Maslowski 
and others (2007) claim that educational decentralisation is often employed in hope to 
enhance the quality of education. Several studies like Barankay and Lockwood (2007) 
as well as Falch and Fischer (2012) show that decentralisation has a positive effect on 
education attainment. Furthermore, Faguet (2004) discovers that local governments in 
Bolivia retain superior knowledge of idiosyncratic educational preferences, and thus 
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 produce better outcomes. Additionally, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) report positive 
results for public education decentralisation in Argentina in the early 1990s.  
 
Most of the papers examining the impact of educational decentralisation on student 
outcomes (Chubb and Moe 1990; Bishop and Woessmann 2004; Fuchs and Woessmann 
2007) have focused on school autonomy as a measure of decentralisation, without 
isolating both effects and giving particular attention to the degree of governmental 
involvement. One of the main contributions of our study is the isolation of both impacts 
on the quality of education, which is an addition to the scarce number of researchers 
doing so. 
  
2.2. Autonomy management 
 
Based on economic models of school governance, Hoxby (1999) together with Nechyba 
(2003) argue that an increase in autonomy is likely to result in a rise in the efficiency of 
public schools. Woessmann (2001), as well as Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) show that 
students perform significantly better in schools that have autonomy in process and 
personnel decisions such as budget allocations, hiring and firing teachers, in addition to 
the choice of textbooks and methods of instruction. Additionally, Naper (2010) and 
Robin and Sprietsma (2003) show that autonomy in hiring of teachers heightens school 
effectiveness. Autonomy in staffing decisions also proves to positively affect students’ 
test scores in mathematics based on the PISA 2003 database (Woessmann and others 
2009). Likewise, Clark (2005) as well as Eskeland and Filmer (2007) report a positive 
relation of school autonomy in management on educational outcomes in the United 
Kingdom and Argentina respectively. Similarly, Eurydice (2007) provides evidence of a 
positive effect of school autonomy on learning in Europe. On the other hand, autonomy 
in some areas can lead to negative consequences. Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) as 
well as Woessmann and others (2009) argue that school autonomy regarding budget 
formulation and teacher autonomy regarding subject topics to be covered in class have a 
negative impact on student test scores. In addition, Woessmann (2001) shows that 
school autonomy in budget formulation has a negative effect on student test scores in 
both mathematics and science.  
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 Moreover, Hanushek and others (2013) use cross-country panel analysis for 42 
countries over ten years to show that autonomy has a significant impact on school 
performance; however this impact differs depending on the country’s level of 
development. They find that in developed countries, the impact of school autonomy in 
decision-making is positive, while it is oppositely negative in developing countries 
especially in areas related to academic content. Using a sample of eight Latin American 
countries, Gunnarsson and others (2009) show that school autonomy has no significant 
effect on school performance. Moreover, Bardhan (2002) adds that autonomous 
decision-making is likely to fail in developing countries due to inadequacy in 
experience and skills of the local officials. Using a quintile regression model, the sole 
paper that examines the effects of school autonomy on skills proxied by student 
achievement in the MENA region, shows that it has a negative effect on mathematics 
test scores in Jordan and Tunisia, where school autonomy is defined as pedagogical 
autonomy over textbooks, course content and the offered courses (Shafiq 2011). 
 
To sum up, the reviewed literature shows support for the positive impact of autonomy 
management and distribution of responsibilities between schools and administration on 
the quality of education. However, school autonomy does not lead to beneficial 
consequences in all cases. Furthermore, the effectiveness of school autonomy also 
depends on the country’s level of development, where autonomy is more likely to be 
successful in developed countries, than in developing ones.  
 
2.3. Ownership, Funding and Competition 
 
A major institutional aspect that has been the core of evaluation of various researches is 
the performance of publicly operated schools versus the performance of privately 
operated schools, in addition to the effect of competition due to the presence of private 
schools (Hoxby 2003; Rouse and Barrow 2009).  
 
Scheifer (1998) as well as Bishop and Woessmann (2004) state that economic theory is 
ambiguous when it comes to the impact of public versus private management in 
education, where some researchers claim the existence of a positive impact of private 
operation of schools on student performance, others indicate that the type of school has 
no effect on student outcomes when controlling for the socioeconomic environment and 
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 a third group states a negative effect of privately operated schools. Studies which are in 
favour of private schools operation include: those examining the United States like 
Hanushek (1986), Neal (1997) and Opdenakker and Van Damme (2006) and those 
examining developing countries like Cox and Jimenez (1991)). In addition to papers 
using data from PISA-2000 like Corten and Dronkers (2006) and Fuchs and 
Woessmann (2007), which provide empirical support indicating an association between 
privately operated schools and higher student test scores. On the contrary, other studies 
state that subsequent to controlling for the student’s socioeconomic background, the 
type of school operation has no effect on achievement. Those studies include Dronkers 
(2004) as well as Altonji and others (2005) studying the United States. In addition to 
Fertig (2003) who use German PISA data showing no effect regarding the type of 
school. Furthermore, there is a third group of studies claiming a negative effect of 
privately operated schools on student outcomes like Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) 
on Finland and Newhouse and Beegle (2006) on Indonesia. 
 
The use of market mechanism is considered to be a form of decentralisation where the 
promotion of more competition induces individual schools to increase student 
achievement due to parental demand. Woessmann and others (2009) find that when 
students possess a variety of schools to choose from, improved student achievement is 
observed. Similarly, West and Woessmann (2010) state that school systems that 
encompass a number of privately operated schools create alternatives for students, 
which as a result increase public schools performance due to private-sector competition. 
Furthermore, Bjorklund and others (2004) as well as Sandstrom and Bergstrom (2005) 
find evidence of improved performance of public schools in Sweden as a consequence 
of competition from privately operated schools, while Bradley and Taylor (2002) and 
Levacic (2004) report the same positive impact for English schools. Observing the 
magnet schools program in the US where the zone barriers for schools are eliminated 
and thus school choice is increased, Gamoran (1996) as well as Bifulco and others 
(2008) showed that students who attended those schools scored higher on achievement 
exams. Moreover, Frankenberig and Seigel-Hawley (2008) discovered positive 
influence of magnet schools on decreasing dropout rates. On the contrary, analysing an 
educational UK reform, Clark (2005) finds only a slight positive impact of market 
competition, as spillover effects were very small.   
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 2.4. Accountability 
 
Numerous countries have experienced a boost in accountability of local schools for 
student performance such as the United Kingdom’s “league tables” systems and the 
United States’ “No Child Left Behind” federal law (Hanushek and Woessmann 2011). 
The concept of accountability dates back to the second half of the twentieth century 
where Stiglitz (2002) as well as others showed that markets fail in absence of 
information. This concept is the same for the education market where better student 
knowledge is enhanced by adequate information on performance. Carnoy and Loeb 
(2003) as well as Dee and Jacob (2011) provide evidence in support of a positive effect 
of strong state accountability systems on student attainment. According to Woessmann 
and others (2009), accountability procedures related to teachers, as well as schools such 
as posting achievement data publicly or using assessments as a comparison to district or 
national achievement have a positive impact on the quality of education provided. 
Schools and countries that apply diverse forms of accountability policies (aimed at 
students, teachers and schools) possess better student performance (Woessmann and 
others 2009).   
 
Several countries such as England and France publish national league tables of schools 
on the basis of student performance on central exams, thus inducing schools to perform 
better. Moreover, parental involvement is also considered a method of accountability 
where principal-agent theory on teacher and parents argue that it reinforces schools to 
be self-serving and utilize funds according to parental demand and thus become more 
efficient (Prichett and Filmer 1999; Shafiq 2011). 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
In this section, PISA data well as the variables studied are explained and the 
econometric strategy used in the empirical analysis is illustrated. 
  
3.1. PISA Data  
 
The data used in this study is extracted from the “Programme for International Student 
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 Assessment” (PISA) 2009 database. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) initiated PISA, which is an international program occurring 
every three years, since the year 2000, with a goal of assessing the achievement of 
students who are 15 years old at the time of the test, in three domains: reading, 
mathematics and science. The PISA 2009 database was the fourth edition, which 
included approximately 470,000 students from 65 countries. The Tunisian sample 
includes 4,955 students from 165 different schools, while the Jordanian sample includes 
6,489 students from 210 schools (OECD 2009). 
 
In order to empirically estimate the impacts of the decentralisation and school autonomy 
variables in both countries, institutional characteristics are primarily employed. 
However, student performance is dependent on several other factors within and without 
the school system; hence those characteristics must be taken into account in order to 
isolate the institutional impacts. Therefore, our control variables involve students’ 
personal characteristics, household variables, as well as school factors. The institutional 
factors, which are our main variables of study, are the divided into decentralisation and 
some variables related to autonomy, such as school management, ownership and 
funding, competition, and accountability (all descriptive values are shown in table 1).  
 
Decentralisation. It is analysed through whether the regional or local education 
authorities have complete or shared sizeable responsibility versus the national education 
authority for the following tasks: hiring and firing teachers, determining teachers’ 
salaries increases, formulating the school budget, deciding on budget allocations within 
the school, establishing student assessment policies and determining course content. 
Decentralisation is still considered a new concept for the MENA region, thus it is more 
probable to witness partial decentralisation than complete decentralisation, since 
national education authorities still have at least shared responsibility in decision-
making. 
 
Autonomy management. It involves whether the principals, teachers or school governing 
board have considerable responsibility for the following tasks: hiring and firing 
teachers, determining teachers’ salaries increases, formulating the school budget, 
deciding on budget allocations within the school, establishing student assessment 
policies, approving students’ admission to school, choosing which textbooks are used 
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 and determining course content.  
 
Ownership and Funding. It includes the type of the school (public or private) and the 
school’s source of funding (whether private funding is higher than 20 per cent of total 
resources).  
 
Competition. It is measured by examining whether the school has one or more schools 
competing for students.  
 
Accountability.  It is analysed through observing whether the assessments of students 
are used as a comparison to district/national performance or as a comparison to other 
schools, in addition to whether achievement data are posted publicly (for example in the 
media). Furthermore, parental pressure on schools is also included; where it is divided 
into two variables whether the parental pressure is a majority or a minority.  
 
(Insert table 1 around here) 
 
Students’ personal characteristics include student age, gender, the grade level, as well as 
whether he lives with both his parents or not (family structure). Household variables 
compromise socio-economic and cultural characteristics, as well as educational 
resources. Regarding the socio-economic and cultural characteristics, the variables 
considered are the student’s mother’s and father’s years of schooling, whether the 
parents are active in the labour market or not, as well as the father’s occupation which is 
classified as follows: qualified white collar, non-qualified white collar, qualified blue 
collar and non-qualified blue collar. Also, a dummy variable is included taking a value 
of ‘1’ if there are more than 25 books at home and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. The 
educational resources consider whether the student uses a computer at home in addition 
to a PISA index (Home Educational Resources), which refers to whether the student has 
access to school resources at home such as a desk and a dictionary.  
 
School variables include school characteristics, school parental status, school policies, 
as well as staff-related aspects. School characteristics refer to the school location 
(village, town or city), the school size (total school enrolment), the class size (number of 
students in class), the students’ composition at school (percentage of girls), as well as 
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 the percentage of repeating students and the number of computers connected to the 
Internet. In addition to the learning time (minutes per week) devoted to reading and 
mathematics, and whether the learning of students is hindered by student absenteeism. 
School parental status includes the occupation, which takes the mode value of the 
parents’ occupations at each school, as well as the school educational climate, which 
take the value of the average years of parents’ schooling. School policies compromise 
several issues like the streaming of students by ability, and whether the student 
admission is based on: residence, academic performance, recommendation of feeder 
school, parents’ endorsement of the instructional or religious philosophy of the school, 
students’ interest in a special program and preference to family members of current or 
former students. Moreover, a dummy variable taking the value of ‘1’ if a student would 
be transferred to another school because of behavioural problems, and a value of ‘0’ 
otherwise, is included. Finally, staff-related aspects include whether the principal is a 
woman or not, the proportion of qualified teachers, the student-teacher ratio, and 
whether the student learning is hindered by: lack of mathematics or reading teachers, 
teacher shortage or a bad student-teacher relationship.  
 
3.2. Empirical Strategy  
 
PISA data is obtained through a two-stage stratified sampling technique. This two-step 
stratified sample procedure leads to nesting students at the first level with schools on the 
second level. Therefore, within the same class or same school, the individual 
measurements are not independent. This is considered a violation of independence; thus 
traditional regression models at student level cannot be used. Hierarchical Linear Model 
(HLM) has a nested structure, which permits regression coefficients to vary from one 
context to another (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). Accordingly, Hierarchical Linear 
Modelling (HLM) is regarded as an ideal procedure for our analysis.  
 
Equations (1) to (4) below represent the econometric model used, where Yij is the 
achievement in each competence of a student ‘i’ in school ‘j’, Xkij is a vector of ‘k’ 
characteristics of student ‘i’ at school ‘j’ (or independent variables at level 1), and Zlj is 
a vector of ‘l’ characteristics of school ‘j’ (or independent variables at level 2). Random 
effects are j (at school level) and ij, (at student level). β are the estimated parameters. 
Equation (4) is obtained by introducing equations (2) and (3) into equation (1). Thus, in 
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 equation (4) a set of fixed effects (00, 10 Xkij, 0l Zlj) can be distinguished from a group 
of random effects (0j, ij). We choose not to introduce random effects in equation (3), 
as we are interested in estimating mean effects for the whole sample.  
Yij= j + 

n
1k
1j Xkij+ ij ij ~ N(0,2)         (1) 
0j= 00 + 
l
0l Zlj+ 0j  0j ~ N(0,)         (2) 
1j= 10     1j ~ N(0,)                      (3) 
Yij= 00 + 10 Xkij+0l Zlj +0j +ij             (4) 
 
Similarly like all surveys and questionnaires of this kind, the PISA 2009 database 
includes some missing data. However, this problem is minor for most variables in the 
Tunisian and Jordanian dataset where the missing values’ percentage is below five per 
cent. Only a few variables exhibit a missing rate slightly above 10 per cent. In order to 
handle this missing data problem, we use data imputation following the regression 
imputation method suggested by the OECD (2012), where missing values are replaced 
by the predicted values obtained from regression. The dependent variable of our 
regression is the individual indicator holding the missing value, whereas the explanatory 
variables are the individual indicators exhibiting a strong relation with the dependent 
variable (a high degree of correlation). The regression imputation method holds a 
superior advantage over replacing missing values with the average value since it 
produces a unique value for each case depending on the other related explanatory 
variables. Finally, our estimations provided robust standard errors and multicollinearity 
was not observed (all VIF values being below 4). 
 
 
4. Results 
 
This section discusses our estimation results of the impact of decentralisation and 
school autonomy variables on the quality of education. It has to be noted that when 
analysing decentralisation, only public schools are considered since only these schools 
are relevant. 
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 Our results are shown through four tables: Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the 
HLM regressions on the mathematics and reading achievement scores, for the whole 
sample (School Autonomy Variables) and the subsample (Decentralisation Variables) 
respectively in Tunisia. While tables 4 and 5 present the same type of results for Jordan.  
 
4.1. Tunisia 
 
First, focus is directed to table 2, which reveals our findings regarding the school 
autonomy variables considering the whole sample (public and private schools). Looking 
at the autonomy management variables, we discovered that none of those variables have 
a significant effect on student performance in either mathematics or reading literacy 
tests. This means that school autonomy on personnel decisions, financial resources or 
curriculum does not cause any difference in student achievement. This finding is in line 
with previous literature on developing countries where no impact of autonomy 
management is expected (Gunnarsson and others 2009). 
 
On the contrary, the ownership and funding variables proved to notably have a 
significant effect on the quality of education; however their impacts go in reverse ways. 
Opposing to previous literature indicating that private school operation leads to higher 
quality than public school operation (Shleifer 1998; Bishop and Woessmann 2004), yet 
aligned with other studies like Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) and Newhouse and 
Beegle (2006), our results show that publicly operated schools have a highly significant 
positive impact on student test scores in both mathematics and reading. On the other 
hand, a higher percentage of private funding in any type of school leads to a boost in 
student achievement in both tested domains. Having a share of private funding 
equivalent to a value higher than 20 per cent increases student test scores in both 
mathematics and reading. Prior economic literature shows support for the positive 
impact of having a competitive education market (Levacic 2004; West and Woessmann 
2010), yet our results show that the results do not differ significantly between a school 
that has one or more schools competing for its students and another that does not.  
 
Regarding accountability measures, our findings are aligned with previous studies like 
Prichet and Filmer (1999) and Shafiq (2011), showing the importance of parental 
influence in Tunisia, where student test scores are higher in mathematics and reading 
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 when most parents pressure the school to achieve higher academic standards. However, 
schools that use students’ assessments as a comparison to district/national performance 
or to other schools, do not lead to a difference in student performance in mathematics, 
but only has a positive effect on reading literacy. Posting achievement data publicly has 
no significant effect on student achievement in either mathematics or reading.  
 
(Insert table 2 around here) 
 
Looking at table 3, regression results regarding the impact of decentralisation on the 
quality of education are shown, where the subsample containing only public schools is 
considered. Our findings show that most of the decentralisation variables do not have a 
highly significant effect on student test scores in either domain, especially the reading 
literacy domain.  Students who are enrolled in schools that exhibit complete or partial 
decentralisation in personnel decisions like hiring and firing teachers do not achieve 
significantly distinctive results than other students who are enrolled in centralised 
schools. Concerning complete or partial decentralisation in formulating the school 
budget and in establishing student assessment policies, students who attend schools 
where the regional or local education authorities have complete or shared sizeable 
responsibility in those tasks score higher in mathematics; however it does not affect 
reading literacy test scores. It has to be noted that the results regarding the control 
variables, as well as the school autonomy variables do not experience considerable 
significant changes after introducing our decentralisation variables (results available 
upon request). 
 
 (Insert table 3 around here) 
 
4.2. Jordan 
 
First, we reflect our findings on school autonomy variables, which are shown in table 4 
considering the whole sample. Observing autonomy management variables, our findings 
reveal that most of those variables have no significant effect on student performance in 
either mathematics or reading literacy tests. School autonomy in hiring and firing 
teachers seems to have a significant negative impact on student performance in 
mathematics only, as well as school autonomy in approving students for admission to 
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 the school which shows a negative association with reading test scores. This finding 
contradicts previous literature where a positive relationship was indicated between 
student performance and autonomy in personnel decisions such as hiring and firing 
teachers (Woessmann 2001; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007).  
 
The ownership and funding variables prove to have a low or no significant effect on the 
quality of education. Being a publicly operated or a privately operated school has no 
effect on student attainment in any of the domains examined in our study. However, 
having a higher percentage of private funding leads to an improvement in student 
achievement in reading literacy only.  
 
Researchers like Bradley and Taylor (2002) and Sandstrom and Bergstrom (2005) give 
support for the positive association between competition and student performance, 
nonetheless our results are aligned with their finding only when it comes to mathematics 
test scores. A school that has one or more schools competing for its students leads to a 
rise of points in mathematics, but does not lead to different outcomes in reading 
compared to another school that experiences no competition.  
 
The three variables used as a measure of accountability seem to play an important role 
on the quality of education in Jordan where parental influence has a significant positive 
influence on student performance when most parents pressure the school to achieve 
higher academic standards. Additionally, schools that use students’ assessments as a 
comparison to district/national performance or to other schools, cause a rise in student 
attainment in both mathematics and reading literacy. Posting achievement data publicly 
has no significant effect on student achievement in mathematics; nevertheless it reduces 
reading test scores.  
 
(Insert table 4 around here) 
 
Observing table 5, regression results regarding the impact of decentralisation on the 
quality of education in Jordan are shown, where the subsample containing only public 
schools is considered. Our findings show that decentralisation does not have a highly 
significant impact on the quality of education in most areas. Students who attend 
schools that reveal complete or partial decentralisation in either establishing student 
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 assessment policies or determining course content do not achieve significantly 
distinctive results than other students who are enrolled in centralised schools. However, 
students who are enrolled in schools that exhibit complete or partial decentralisation in 
the area of hiring and firing teachers and determining teachers’ salaries achieve higher 
results in achievement exams, in comparison to other students who are enrolled in 
centralised schools. Results regarding the control variables, as well as the school 
autonomy variables do not experience considerable significant changes after introducing 
our decentralisation variables (available upon request). 
 
(Insert table 5 around here) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is universally acknowledged that an effective institutional structure is a crucial tool 
for having a highly functioning education system. Decentralisation of public services, 
especially educational services has been a common recommendation by several 
international agencies like the World Bank, the OECD and the United Nations since the 
1960s, as it is considered a means for growth and development, and has been 
implemented by various countries around the globe. Previous research has been 
considerably ambiguous regarding the impact of decentralisation and school autonomy 
on the quality of education. Empirical studies regarding this topic are limited, especially 
for developing countries. 
 
Our study is an addition to the scarce literature, where we tackle this issue by examining 
the effects of decentralisation and school autonomy (this considers school management, 
ownership and funding, competition and accountability measures) on the quality of 
education in Jordan and Tunisia, after controlling for school factors, student and family 
characteristics by using the OECD PISA 2009 database. 
 
Our findings are somewhat aligned with the understanding that decentralisation reforms 
improve student achievement, yet this is revealed in limited areas of decision-making. 
Complete or partial decentralisation in school budget formulation and establishing 
student assessment policies is positively associated with student achievement in 
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 mathematics in Tunisia, while decentralisation in personnel decisions has a positive 
effect on student achievement in both mathematics and reading literacy in Jordan as 
well as the task of hiring and firing teachers on mathematics test scores. 
 
Regarding school autonomy variables, we find that autonomy management has no 
significant effect on student attainment in both countries, except for a minor negative 
impact in Jordan. Results on ownership reveal that publically operated schools perform 
significantly better in Tunisia in both mathematics and reading literacy. However the 
type of school operation has no effect on achievement in Jordan. In addition, private 
funding in all types of schools leads to a rise in students’ test scores in both countries. In 
relation to competition, the presence of one or more schools competing in the same area 
has no significant impact on student achievement, with the exception of a slight positive 
effect on mathematics in Jordan. Concerning the accountability variables examined, our 
findings show that comparing students’ assessments to district/national performance or 
other schools, as well as parental pressure on schools both play an important positive 
role in Tunisia and Jordan. However, schools that post achievement data publicly do not 
lead to distinctive student test scores, except for a slight negative impact where scores 
marginally decrease in reading literacy in Jordan.  
 
To sum up, our results show some positive effects of decentralisation on student 
achievement. Regarding school autonomy; it appeared that when autonomy is related to 
the management of the centres, it has no significant impact on students’ attainment. The 
same was observed for school competition. However, ownership (public schools) as 
well as percentage of private funding exposed a positive association with the quality of 
education. The existence of accounting systems whether related to families or schools 
also revealed a positive relation. Accordingly, these results are expected to be valuable 
and of use for policy makers and government officials when designing educational 
systems in aim to improve students’ achievement and higher education standards, 
especially in the MENA region.  
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 Table 1: Main descriptives: Institutional settings (Tunisia and Jordan) 
 
 Tunisia Jordan 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Decentralisation     
Hiring and firing teachers: 
- Completely or Partially  
decentralized 
 
0.206 
 
0.404 
 
0.160 
 
 
0.366 
- Centralised 0.794 0.404 0.840 0.366 
Determining teachers’ salaries 
increases:  
- Completely or Partially 
decentralised  
   
 
0.054 
 
 
0.225 
- Centralised   0.947 0.225 
Formulating school budget:  
- Completely or Partially 
decentralised 
 
0.497 
 
0.500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Centralised 0.503 0.500   
Establishing student assessment 
policies: 
- Completely or Partially 
decentralised 
 
 
0.140 
 
 
0.347 
 
 
0.196 
 
 
0.397 
- Centralised  0.860 0.347 0.804 0.397 
Determining course content: 
- Completely or Partially 
decentralised 
   
0.093 
 
0.291 
- Centralised   0.907 0.291 
Autonomy Management     
Hiring and firing teachers 0.042 0.201 0.092 0.289 
Determining teachers’ salaries 
increases  
0.022 0.148 0.085 0.278 
Formulating school budget 0.327 0.469 0.901 0.299 
Deciding on budget allocations 0.920 0.272 0.874 0.332 
Establishing student assessment 
policies 
0.304 0.460 0.432 0.495 
Approving students’ admission to 
school 
0.934 0.248 0.898 0.303 
Choosing textbooks 0.022 0.146 0.099 0.298 
Determining course content 0.158 0.364 0.079 0.270 
Ownership and Funding     
Public School 0.978 0.148 0.862 0.345 
Private school 0.022 0.148 0.138 0.345 
Private Funding (>20%) 0.242 0.428 0.157 0.364 
Competition (yes) 0.655 0.476 0.724 0.447 
Accountability     
No parental pressure  0.454 0.498 0.308 0.462 
Parental pressure (Minority) 0.393 0.489 0.393 0.488 
Parental pressure (Majority) 0.153 0.360 0.300 0.458 
Comparing students’ assessments to 
district/national performance or 
other schools 
0.897 0.305 0.827 0.378 
Posting achievement data publicly 0.064 0.245 0.219 0.414 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
22
 Table 2: Tunisia School Autonomy Regression Results (Whole Sample) 
 
  Mathematics Reading 
 
Constant  
 
132.066** 
(65.807) 
 
451.150*** 
(88.904) 
Institutional Settings   
Autonomy Management   
Hiring and firing teachers 4.441 
(11.824) 
4.539 
(9.846) 
Formulating school budget -8.639 
(5.389) 
1.009 
(4.830) 
Deciding on budget allocations -3.019 
(5.673) 
-0.045 
(5.637) 
Establishing student assessment 
policies 
-3.171 
(4.609) 
-5.809 
(4.739) 
Approving students’ admission to 
school 
-9.057 
(8.903) 
-0.311 
(9.136) 
Choosing textbooks -6.148 
(10.667) 
-15.989 
(13.778) 
Determining course content -2.453 
(5.259) 
3.080 
(4.417) 
Ownership and Funding   
Private school -56.638*** 
(14.701) 
-51.711*** 
(13.583) 
Private Funding (>25%) 9.3645* 
(5.072) 
9.746* 
(5.338) 
Competition -4.006 
(5.490) 
-0.061 
(4.889) 
Accountability   
Parental pressure (Minority) 0.729 
(4.437) 
1.193 
(4.007) 
Parental pressure (Majority) 11.911* 
(6.766) 
10.622* 
(6.116) 
Comparing students’ assessments to 
district/national performance or other 
schools 
10.095 
(7.522) 
12.751** 
(5.037) 
Posting achievement data publicly -3.665 
(7.706) 
8.112 
(7.891) 
Student and Family Characteristics  Yes Yes 
School Factors Yes Yes 
N observations  4,872 4,872 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Table 3: Tunisia Decentralisation Regression Results (Subsample) 
 Hiring and Firing Teachers Formulating School Budget Establishing student assessment 
policies 
 Mathematics  Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics  Reading  
 Constant  120.099* 
(60.862) 
231.773*** 
(66.212) 
148.026** 
(67.763) 
274.317*** 
(71.352) 
96.811 
(79.811) 
191.855** 
(72.186) 
Institutional Settings       
Decentralisation       
Hiring and Firing teachers -4.367 
(5.566) 
-5.860 
(4.946) 
    
Formulating school budget   6.865* 
(3.747) 
0.379 
(3.921) 
  
Establishing student assessment policies      10.719* 
(6.180) 
0.712 
(6.001) 
Autonomy Management       
Hiring and firing teachers 1.877 
(13.456) 
6.639 
(10.694) 
9.699 
(11.506) 
-2.102 
(9.852) 
1.697 
(11.132) 
-0.492 
(8.028) 
Formulating school budget -11.409** 
(5.236) 
-0.523 
(4.684) 
-12.304** 
(5.453) 
0.424 
(4.984) 
-10.060* 
(5.639) 
5.028 
(4.407) 
Deciding on budget allocations -1.587 
(5.991) 
-1.007 
(5.634) 
-5.181 
(5.646) 
-10.570** 
(5.085) 
-3.214 
(7.080) 
-1.276 
(5.354) 
Establishing student assessment policies 1.445 
(4.352) 
-3.210 
(4.583) 
-0.230 
(4.227) 
-4.738 
(4.813) 
-9.308 
(6.567) 
-9.665 
(6.514) 
Approving students’ admission to school -7.677 
(8.684) 
-0.428 
(9.773) 
-14.827 
(9.999) 
-0.614 
(11.618) 
-9.038 
(8.742) 
3.379 
(8.617) 
Choosing textbooks -5.973 
(13.290) 
12.626 
(8.394) 
-0.379 
(11.906) 
15.741* 
(8.560) 
-60.577** 
(24.008) 
-65.559 
(31.262) 
Determining course content 2.851 
(5.165) 
8.932* 
(4.626) 
-3.196 
(4.948) 
7.649 
(4.857) 
0.744 
(5.836) 
4.815 
(4.485) 
Private Funding (>25%) 11.147** 
(5.035) 
11.390** 
(5.322) 
11.102** 
(5.504) 
10.447* 
(5.386) 
13.928** 
(5.615) 
12.662** 
(5.222) 
24
  Mathematics Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics Reading 
Competition 4.266 
(5.154) 
0.247 
(4.630) 
8.243 
(5.017) 
2.959 
(4.247) 
8.745 
(5.523) 
2.460 
(4.632) 
Accountability       
Parental pressure (Minority) -0.706 
(4.269) 
3.597 
(4.276) 
4.808 
(4.217) 
5.024 
(4.554) 
-0.083 
(5.003) 
7.611* 
(4.384) 
 
Parental pressure (Majority) 
5.573 
(0.387) 
9.242 
(5.906) 
16.587*** 
(6.101) 
14.751** 
(6.322) 
4.014 
(7.331) 
9.412 
(5.956) 
Comparing students’ assessments to district/national 
performance or other schools 
18.530** 
(7.136) 
14.704*** 
(5.134) 
15.683** 
(7.540) 
14.276** 
(5.549) 
17.254** 
(8.233) 
11.777* 
(6.185) 
Posting achievement data publicly 8.838 
(6.644) 
14.858* 
(7.535) 
2.750 
(6.350) 
14.242* 
(7.451) 
5.138 
(7.249) 
10.359 
(6.512) 
Student and Family Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations  4,744 4,744 4,142 4,142 3,977 3,977 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Table 4: Jordan School Autonomy Regression Results (Whole Sample) 
 Mathematics Reading 
Constant  116.609 
(108.127) 
188.402** 
(86.107) 
Institutional Settings   
Autonomy Management   
Hiring and firing teachers -55.727** 
(24.027) 
-19.704 
(22.789) 
Determining teachers’ salaries increases 14.932 
(21.837) 
-13.893 
(23.672) 
Formulating school budget 12.040 
(12.594) 
-4.923 
(11.011) 
Deciding on budget allocations -11.587 
(9.743) 
8.449 
(10.179) 
Establishing student assessment policies -8.335 
(8.705) 
-6.051 
(7.099) 
Approving students’ admission to school -8.286 
(11.994) 
-19.312* 
(10.210) 
Choosing textbooks 3.511 
(12.337) 
-0.606 
(11.198) 
Determining course content -17.390 
(16.026) 
-19.194 
(15.038) 
Ownership and Funding   
Private school 31.712 
(26.078) 
1.474 
(22.366) 
Private Funding (>25%) 4.082 
(24.257) 
35.954* 
(21.494) 
Competition 14.870* 
(8.268) 
9.812 
(6.996) 
Accountability   
Parental pressure (Minority) 16.567* 
(8.750) 
11.528* 
(6.675) 
Parental pressure (Majority) 26.633** 
(10.327) 
15.020 
(9.986) 
Comparing students’ assessments to 
district/national performance or other 
schools 
19.868* 
(10.695) 
20.271** 
(9.977) 
Posting achievement data publicly -11.624 
(10.594) 
-10.398* 
(9.410) 
Student and Family Characteristics  Yes Yes 
School Factors Yes Yes 
N observations 6,322 6,322 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Table 5: Jordan Decentralisation Regression Results (Subsample) 
 
 Hiring and Firing Teachers Determining teachers’ 
salaries increases 
Establishing student 
assessment policies 
Determining course content 
 Mathematics Reading Mathematics  Reading  Mathematics  Reading  Mathematics Reading  
Constant  63.142 
(117.750) 
137.422 
(96.736) 
51.538 
(113.806) 
122.881 
(95.440) 
-18.413 
(138.588) 
73.068 
(115.014) 
94.890 
(119.214) 
163.264 
(99.025) 
Institutional settings         
Decentralisation          
Hiring and firing teachers  16.176* 
(9.059) 
4.729 
(6.872) 
      
Determining teachers’ salaries 
increases 
  48.209*** 
(13.780) 
27.644*** 
(9.789) 
    
Establishing student assessment 
policies 
    4.839 
(13.329) 
12.645 
(10.573) 
  
Determining course content       -8.127 
(13.589) 
-0.915 
(10.473) 
Autonomy Management         
Hiring and firing teachers -66.219*** 
(24.826) 
-37.020* 
(18.850) 
-70.022*** 
(24.816) 
-29.175* 
(17.050) 
-34.219 
(25.156) 
-11.898 
(21.063) 
-48.414** 
(24.226) 
-19.567 
(19.162) 
Determining teachers’ salaries 
increases 
 
45.713*** 
(16.850) 
 
26.852** 
(12.995) 
 
54.822*** 
(18.953) 
 
21.475 
(13.685) 
 
-25.478 
(33.016) 
 
-57.491** 
(25.501) 
 
19.966 
(14.708) 
 
-14.538 
(13.556) 
Formulating school budget 23.440* 
(12.510) 
2.430 
(10.656) 
26.549** 
(12.334) 
3.493 
(9.933) 
28.641* 
(15.877) 
17.118 
(14.093) 
16.638 
(12.432) 
-9.942 
(10.845) 
Deciding on budget allocations -8.647 
(10.800) 
10.900 
(10.646) 
-12.744 
(8.984) 
8.913 
(9.558) 
-6.527 
(15.923) 
0.441 
(13.549) 
-8.464 
(10.487) 
9.9197 
(9.119) 
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  Mathematics Reading Mathematics  Reading  Mathematics  Reading  Mathematics Reading  
Establishing student assessment 
policies 
-11.776 
(7.790) 
-8.460 
(6.107) 
-16.169** 
(7.608) 
-11.360* 
(6.034) 
-38.713** 
(14.655) 
-37.532*** 
(12.615) 
0.775 
(8.340) 
2.954 
(6.451) 
Approving students’ admission to 
school 
1.452 
(20.268) 
-12.335 
(7.886) 
2.364 
(10.169) 
-10.609 
(7.750) 
-10.537 
(11.053) 
-12.846 
(9.013) 
-15.020 
(11.335) 
-22.117** 
(9.990) 
Choosing textbooks 7.735 
(11.506) 
3.851 
(10.092) 
3.072 
(11.284) 
0.895 
(10.816) 
-16.906 
(19.322) 
-7.657 
(14.617) 
20.884 
(13.350) 
3.147 
(11.833) 
Determining course content 7.745 
(13.513) 
6.282 
(10.654) 
17.898 
(11.112) 
9.695 
(9.178) 
27.894** 
(11.662) 
3.150 
(15.284) 
16.775 
(18.553) 
-11.947 
(16.891) 
Private Funding (>25%) 24.417* 
(12.817) 
35.785*** 
(10.605) 
-2.245 
(14.404) 
17.888 
(11.500) 
25.932 
(17.537) 
34.556** 
(17.239) 
30.226** 
(12.339) 
34.537*** 
(11.132) 
Competition 17.918** 
(7.343) 
12.323** 
(5.782) 
14.945** 
(7.394) 
11.224** 
(5.523) 
14.281 
(11.322) 
9.083 
(9.946) 
20.404*** 
(7.631) 
15.243** 
(5.845) 
Accountability         
Parental pressure (Minority) 16.824* 
(9.273) 
6.449 
(6.562) 
18.786** 
(8.755) 
7.102 
(6.546) 
23.425* 
(11.924) 
19.288** 
(8.925) 
15.934* 
(9.246) 
4.586 
(6.685) 
Parental pressure (Majority) 20.977* 
(12.052) 
6.679 
(8.207) 
24.794** 
(11.451) 
7.814 
(8.123) 
36.957** 
(15.642) 
30.575*** 
(11.093) 
21.226* 
(10.968) 
0.244 
(7.606) 
Comparing students’ assessments 
to district/national performance or 
other school 
 
14.415 
(9.787) 
 
12.323** 
(5.782) 
 
16.470 
(10.325) 
 
8.996 
(6.816) 
 
9.593 
(11.783) 
 
18.488* 
(9.946) 
 
8.856 
(9.830) 
 
5.874 
(6.869) 
Posting achievement data publicly -8.872 
(9.470) 
-12.960 
(8.013) 
-10.656 
(9.531) 
-12.628 
(7.774) 
-35.607** 
(13.579) 
-31.051** 
(12.398) 
-10.693 
(9.132) 
-10.433 
(7.216) 
Student and Family Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations  5,804 5,804 5,804 5,804 3,752 3,752 5,805 5,805 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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